

THE BROKEN 'WE'

Making Sense of Heidegger's Analysis of Everydayness¹

a) Against Platonic Speleophobia

There are two divergent views of (or attitudes towards) everydayness in philosophy. The first portrays everydayness in the somber tones of Plato's myth of the cave. Here, everydayness is seen with disdain: it appears as the sphere of the *doxai*, the merely conventional, self-forgotten existence that is completely caught up in blind routines and habits, a life where no innovation is ever possible, where everybody clings to his role according to the given social standards and nobody really stands for himself and his or her true own being. Everydayness, in other words, is believed to be the disease to which Philosophy is the cure.

Under the influence of some of last century philosophy's most important strands, however, our attitude towards everydayness has fundamentally changed. One of the basic lessons to be learned from Pragmatism, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism, Ordinary Language Philosophy, and some versions of Phenomenology alike is to be critical of the Platonic speleophobia. In this second view, philosophy is not about breaking the fetters of everyday *doxai* and reaching the sun of epistemic truth. If the speleophobic attitude is to be overcome, Philosophy (or the venture in favor of which philosophy should be given up) should stop striving for some archimedic point of view that lies beyond all mere appearances, customary views and shared routine practices. For such an "absolutist" attitude rests both on an epistemological misconception of philosophy² and a "doxological" misconception of the communal everyday viewpoint.

¹ The final version of this paper appeared in *Topos* 11/2 (2005) p. 16-27. I am much indebted to the participants of the second Central- and Eastern European Conference on Phenomenology, especially to Olga Shparaga, Tatiana Shchytsova, Alexei Chernyakov, Lester Embree, and Miguel Angel Quintana Paz.

² Cf. Taylor, Charles: *Overcoming Epistemology*. In: *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge Mass., Cambridge University Press 1995, p. 3-28.

As in Richard Rorty's and Charles Taylor's prominent cases, those advocating the departure from Platonic speleophobia often call Martin Heidegger to their witness. Heidegger's philosophy, especially his analysis of everyday *Dasein* in the first section of *Being and Time*³, is seen as one of the main sources of inspiration for this shift of attitude towards everydayness. These authors, however, draw on a particular view of Heidegger's analysis, an interpretation which could be called the pragmatist one (a more precise label would be "normativist pragmatism").⁴ This line of interpretation lays much emphasis on what Heidegger says about the world-disclosing role of everyday dealings and communal norms. At the same time, however, much less attention is paid to another basic trait of Heidegger's view of everydayness. For Heidegger, our everyday attitudes and normative social practices play not *only* the positive structural role in the disclosedness of our world. Rather, *Dasein*'s everydayness, and especially *Dasein*'s participation in normative social practices, also stands for the morass of *inauthenticity*. In this second sense, our everydayness is something that stands in the way of an adequate self-understanding of *Dasein*, something we have to leave behind in order to be true to ourselves. I believe that we should take this latter idea more seriously than it seems possible within the normativist pragmatist framework (which is of so much influence in the current debate). In this paper, I shall first make some remarks on the issue around which this debate revolves (b). Then, I shall try to cast some doubt on the normativist pragmatist reading of Heidegger's analysis of everydayness (c). The main part of this paper is devoted to gathering some elements of an alternative account (d-f).⁵

³ Quotes from "Being and Time" are based on the translation by Joan Stambaugh (Albany, SUNY press 1996); the pagination refers to the original German edition.

⁴ The main contributions to this line of interpretations are by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark Okrent, John Haugeland, and Robert B. Brandom. For an "participating observation" of this group see Guignon, Charles B.: Heidegger, der amerikanische Pragmatismus und die Analytische Philosophie. Heidegger – gegen die Erkenntnistheorie ins Feld geführt, in: D. Thomä (ed.): *Heidegger-Handbuch*. Stuttgart, Metzler 2003, p. 458-468.

⁵ For a more detailed delineation see Schmid, Hans Bernhard: Heidegger and the 'Cartesian Brainwash'. Towards a Non-Individualistic Account of *Dasein*, forthcoming in the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 35/2 (May 2004).

b) “Falling” - Twice

To capture *Dasein*'s everydayness, Heidegger introduces the term “falling” (*Verfallen*). This concept is rather ambivalent – if not equivocal. On the one hand, Heidegger takes the falling to be a positive (or structural) features of *Dasein*, namely *Dasein*'s “worldliness” or “concreteness”, i.e. those traits of our being Heidegger thought left out or underdeveloped in Husserl's account of transcendental subjectivity. On the other hand, Heidegger is not only Husserl's critic, but also his student. As such he was not willing to give up all reservations against what Husserl called the self-forgotten “natural attitude” of everyday life. For this reason, the falling is assigned a second and quite different role in Heidegger's analysis of everyday *Dasein*, namely the negative role of a fatal tendency of *Dasein* somehow to misunderstand itself, to lose itself in everydayness and to live past its own life. Thus Heidegger's remarks on the falling seems to include an explosive mix between two main ingredients: a strong commitment to the “positive” and enabling role of the falling, and a great deal of depreciation. How is this tension within the concept of falling dealt with in Heidegger's analysis?

The two heterogeneous components of Heidegger's concept of falling are mirrored in the two pictures he introduces to illustrate *Dasein*'s everydayness. The first picture is that of the craftsman in his workshop, the analysis of which serves to capture the basically pragmatic character of our intentionality, and the “worldliness” of our being. Heidegger does not use the term “practical intentionality” himself, but replaces it with terms like “taking care” (*umsichtiges Besorgen*), thus breaking away both from the cognitivist or intellectualist limitations, and from the Cartesian epistemological paradigm. Firstly, intentionality is not a matter of cognition, but of practical everyday coping. Secondly, intentionality is not a mode of representation of the world in the mind, but a form of direct and immediate *contact*: “being-in-the-world”. This twofold reformulation of intentionality is what the first picture of everydayness stands for.

The other picture shows *Dasein*'s everydayness in a far less favorable light. It is the picture of the "One", or, as it is sometimes translated, the "Anyone" (*das Man*). Here, everyday *Dasein* is portrayed as standing in the public sphere, where her actions are not measured by instrumental success, but by social norms. This norm-orientedness has, following Heidegger, fatal consequences for *Dasein*. Whether *Dasein* conventionally conforms to the norms, or purposively breaks them, it does what "one" does (or what "one" does not), and therefore is not really *itself* but a mere "one-self" (*Man-selbst*⁶). It is not really *me* who does what *one* does (or does not), but a mere exchangeable "Anyone". Thus in the guise of social normativity, everydayness distracts *Dasein* from its *own* being, it deflects it from its *own* possibilities,⁷ making it prone to what Heidegger calls *inauthenticity* (*Uneigentlichkeit*).

Comparing these two pictures of everydayness with the two sides of the "falling" mentioned above, it seems obvious that there is a kind of "*division of labor*" between the analysis of practical intentionality on the one hand and the analysis of publicness, of social normativity and norm-oriented action on the other. The sphere of practical intentionality is assigned the role of the positive, structural sense of everydayness, whereas social normativity qua norm-oriented action gets stuck with the negative, inauthentic role.

Thus it seems that Heidegger successfully mitigates the conflict to be found at the heart of his concept of falling by distinguishing these two spheres of everydayness. However, there is big problem connected to this solution, a problem that has been a focus of concern of most critics of *Being and Time* ever since Heidegger's *opus magnum* was published. The problem is that Heidegger's arrangement results in a more or less overt depreciation of *Dasein*'s sociality. It seems that the positive or structural part of everydayness is a matter of the single, isolated individual, whereas any form of sociality, community and social normativity, any kind of involvement with the public sphere is confined to the "negative" side. With a grain of salt one

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 129.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 42.

could say that Heidegger's recommendation for everyday *Dasein* is to withdraw from the public sphere of institutions, communication and social norms, and to retreat to the lonely black forest workshop, where social relations are strictly "functional" and instrumental, i.e. confined to occasional transactions with customers and suppliers.⁸ This role assigned to publicness and social normativity seems unacceptable. If one still wants to take Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* seriously, this feature will have to be changed. For social norms and the public sphere clearly do not just distract us from our own true being, but play a positive and enabling role for our entire being-in-the-world. Social normativity somehow has to be given a place in the structural or positive section of everydayness. The only question is: how is this to be done?

Let me first turn to the influential answer given by the normativist-pragmatist Heideggerians. In the view these interpreters have developed over the last two decades, the very division between practical intentionality and social normativity, the rift between the picture of the lonely craftsman and the public "Anyone" rests on a misconception that is not so much Heidegger's problem but that of his interpreters. Their line of argument runs about as follows.⁹ At the basic level, the things in the world are what we take them to be within our plans for action. Following Dreyfus et al., this always involves social norms. For in this view, the function and use of the "things at hand" (*Zeug*) is not a matter of monological instrumental plans for action, but a matter of normative social practices. No monological goal-oriented actions, but social norms and institutions "disclose" the surrounding world and constitute what Heidegger calls its "functionality contexture" (*Bewandtniszusammenhang*). In this view, the very functioning of the "things at hand" is constituted by social norms, institutions and communal background practices. Thus human practical intentionality

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105.

⁹ For a more detailed account see Schmid, Hans Bernhard: *Gemeinsames Dasein und die Uneigentlichkeit von Individualität*. In: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49 (2001), p. 665-684.

presupposes social normativity. Brandom, Dreyfus, and Haugeland use different names for these social preconditions of practical intentionality. But whatever they call it, it is ultimately Heidegger's "One" or "Anyone" they have in mind. Thus in this interpretation, the "One" or "Anyone" is assigned a new role: it is not the villain in *Dasein*'s everydayness any more, as the traditional view on *Being and Time* has it, but the very base of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.¹⁰

c) Hammers vs. Chessmen – Two Types of "Handyness"

Thus in the perspective of this recent line of interpretation, the whole analysis of everyday *Dasein* shows a completely different face. The "Anyone" appears in a much brighter light now: It does not stand for the morass of inauthenticity anymore, but for a logical precondition of practical intentionality instead. Thus in this view, the lonely workshop is no antipode to the public sphere; its functionality contexture itself appears to be constituted by social norms. Together with the rift between practical intentionality and social normativity, the fundamental ambiguity of everydayness is wiped out in favor of a much brighter view of *Dasein*'s everydayness; there seems to be no space left for the darker tones of Heidegger's analysis of everydayness.

I shall try to defend Heidegger against the conventionalist consequences of the normativist-pragmatist interpretation, and then look for another solution to the initial problem. It seems to me that this interpretation is not only one-sided with respect to the role it ascribes to everydayness, but also wrong both on the interpretive and the argumentative level. Let me focus on the latter. In this perspective, the assumption that practical intentionality *in general* is constituted by social normativity proves to be a conventionalist misconception. There is a fundamental difference between instrumental or goal-oriented action and norm-oriented

¹⁰ For a short collection of quotes by Heidegger that seem to be backing this normativist-pragmatist reading see Taylor Carman, On Being Social. A Reply to Olafson, in *Inquiry* 37 (1994), p. 203-223, p. 219.

action, a difference the conventionalist interpretation cannot account for. Goal-oriented, intentional action is aimed at (and measured by) *instrumental success* – the normative criterion for norm-oriented action is, by contrast to this, *social propriety*. And these are two different sets of criteria that should not be conflated. Social propriety is entirely a question of *what we regard as such*, a question of public recognition. Instrumental success, however, is not. Claiming that the very functioning of tools depends on social norms means conflating what is an “instrumentally successful use” of a “thing at hand” (*Zeug, Zuhandenes*) with what is a “socially proper use”. The conventionalist thesis that the disclosedness of the surrounding world is a matter of the public normative standards might be true for *some* “things at hand”. It is, however, not true for *all* “things at hand”, and especially not for the kind of tools Heidegger uses to illustrate his concept of practical intentionality. It is true for “things at hand” such as chessmen, banknotes, and any other kind of symbols. In cases like these, the function is indeed constituted by social norms. Whether something is a chess figure or not depends on whether or not we *take* it to be a chessman within the social practice of the game. The functionality in question is, within certain limits, independent of the physical properties. Thus a missing prim wooden chessman can easily be replaced with a pebble for the purpose of an informal chess game. If both players *take it* to be the white queen, it simply *is* the white queen. In this sense, it is indeed our normative social practices that *make up* the “thing at hand”. This however is not true for “things at hand” such as bridges, drugs or hammers. The fact that a pharmaceutical product is recognized as such by the Food and Drug Administration, that it is sold by pharmacies and trustfully consumed by thousands of patients does not by itself guarantee that it is really *effective* as a remedy. For this function, as opposed to the function of a chessman, is much less a matter of collective recognition and acceptance, of normative communal practices, than a matter of the world, i.e. of the chemical properties of the substance in question.¹¹ It could well be that without us knowing, the substance in

¹¹ See Searle, John R.: *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York 1995, p. 13ff. This does not mean that

question is really ineffective, or even detrimental to our health. This possibility has no equivalent in the case of symbolic functions. If we *take* x to symbolize y, it *does* symbolize y. The conventionalist (or normativist-pragmatist) interpretation completely covers up the fundamental distinction between these two types of things at hand.¹² It ignores that sometimes practices that are socially proper are not successful.¹³ It also ignores that conversely, practices can be effective even though they violate the conventional standards of social propriety. For this latter case, think of a prisoner in his cell who uses his fork and knife to dig a hole in the wall to prepare his escape. The conventionalist interpreters would stress the fact that our

anything can be assigned functions of the first type, *irrespective* of any physical properties. As Lester Embree pointed out in the discussion, a missing chessman can be replaced by a pebble, but presumably not with a live beetle (or with a large rock, for that matter), so that it seems that the “real world” comes into play here just as in the case of functionings of the kind of “things at hand” such as hammers and bridges. What is the difference between replacing the missing white queen in a chess game set with a pebble and replacing the missing hammer in the toolbox with a suitably shaped stone? I think that the difference is not all that difficult to find: it basically lies in the probability of success of the use of the respective substitute “things at hand”. Whereas the fact that a suitably chosen pebble instead of a prim wooden chessfigure serves as the white queen will not impair the game (given that the replacement is agreed upon between the two players), it is highly likely that (given average handyness) the use of a stone as a substitute hammer will result in nothing but twisted nails, and a bleeding thumb. The physical structure, the “brute qualities” of the object in question impose much stricter limits on its use as a tool (such as a hammer, a bridge, or a remedy) than it does on its symbolic use (such as the use as a chessman, a means of payment, or a traffic sign). This is what I mean by saying that whether something has a function in this latter sense is “up to us” (a question of convention etc.) and not determined by the physical properties, whereas it is “up to the world” whether a given object is “at hand” (in terms of potentially successful use) in the first sense.

¹² Heidegger himself seems to have had no clear understanding of (or simply no interest in) this distinction, even though in the important paragraph on the *handiness of signs* he discusses not only conventional signs (such as signposts), but also signs that are linked to the signified through a causal nexus (such as the west wind which, at least for the apt “reader”, can be “at hand” as a sign for a change in the weather) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 76ff.

¹³ Haugeland explicitly holds that even a substance that is really ineffective can be *at hand*, as long as it is, within a given community, *believed* to be an effective remedy (Cf. John Haugeland: *Dasein's Disclosedness*. In: Dreyfus, Hubert L./Hall, Harrison (Hg.): *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*. Oxford 1992, p. 27-44, p. 32.). It seems to me that the conventionalist interpretation thus unnecessarily gives up the *realistic* potential of Heidegger's reformulation of intentionality. Whether one chooses to call Heidegger a realist or not: he is certainly opposed to epistemological idealism. For one of the basic insights of his reformulation of intentionality is that on the fundamental level of intentionality, the subjective and the objective side (the “act of intending” and its “object”) immediately belong together, and that there is no speaking of care and circumspection without at the same time speaking of the ontological structure of the real world. Thus what is and what is not a “thing at hand”, and the whole functionality contexture of the surrounding world is not *only* a matter of what we accept and recognize in our normative social practices, but *also* and at the same time a matter of what there *really is*. That this is indeed Heidegger's view can be made evident by quoting some of the many passages from “Being and Time” where Heidegger seems to imply that the “they” does not as much disclose as *veil* the world. The conventionalist thus correctly quote from page 127: “Publicness (i.e. the “they”, H.B.S.) initially controls every way in which the world and Da-sein are interpreted”, but this is, as he continues, “not because of an eminent and primary relation of being to “things”, not because it has an explicitly appropriate transparency of Da-sein at its disposal, but because it does not get to “the heart of the matter” (“auf Grund eines Nichteingehens ‘auf die Sachen’)” (...). Publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody”; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, loc. cit., p. 127.

prisoner uses his tools “improperly”, and of course they are right – but only from the perspective of the community whose conventions set up the normative standards by which is measured what counts as “proper” and “improper” behavior on the side of the prisoner. Heidegger by contrast, in distinguishing between intentional practices and the sphere of communal norms, opens the space for a less biased view of the coping practice in question. As far as the prisoner is not fantasizing, as far as, in other words, “world” is disclosed in his working towards escape, it seems to be right to credit his practice with the titles of “caring” and “circumspection”.¹⁴

Thus it seems that Heidegger should be defended against his conventionalist interpreters. There is indeed a difference between instrumental success and social propriety, between the sphere of the “taking care with circumspection” and the Sphere of the “One” or “Anyone”. And at times, there is a tension between the two.

d) Shared Intentions

At this point, I would like to take a step back for a moment in order to open a larger perspective on the relation between intentionality and social normativity. Intentionality, both in the form of cognitive intentionality and in the form of instrumental, goal-oriented action, has still a rather bad reputation in some strands of current philosophy. What we find in the conventionalist interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* is a part of a broader movement, the movement away from the monological analysis of practical or cognitive intentionality, away from the solitary relation between the lonely subject and the world, and the turn towards the sphere of language and communication, sociality and intersubjectivity. This is the general agenda from the early proponents of the “linguistic turn” in philosophy up

¹⁴ The issue at stake here ultimately boils down to the question of whose perspective to adopt. I think that in the philosophy of the last decades, there is a fatal bias against idiosyncratic “disclosedness”, and correspondingly, an overemphasis on the “communal” viewpoint, culminating in the intersubjectivist thesis that *all Dasein is a priori common Dasein*.

to Habermas's intersubjectivism and to the agenda of philosophers such as Robert B. Brandom. I think there is both something right and something deeply wrong about this whole movement. What is right, in my view, is the aversion against the *monologism* of the "philosophy of the subject", and the depreciation of the social that is connected to it; what is wrong in my opinion, is the tacit assumption that in order to break this abominable monologism of the philosophy of the subject, a "shift of paradigm" is in order. In the linguistic-intersubjectivists view, it is necessary to turn away from analysis of intentionality, and to move on to linguistic analysis in order to get rid of the egological limitation of much of earlier philosophy. I think that these critics of "*Bewußtseinsphilosophie*" make the same mistake as the authors they criticise. The tacit (but wrong) idea behind both the linguistic turn away from intentionality and much of earlier intentional analysis is that intentionality is *per se* an incurably monological affair of the Cartesian *ego*, the isolated mind or single individual. Picking up on a remark Annette Baier once made in one of her papers, I would like to speak of a 'Cartesian Brainwash' with regard to this tacit preconception.¹⁵ Ever since Descartes' "meditations", intentionality has always been considered to be a matter of the individual ego. Even Heidegger himself, who in so many respects helped us to unstrap the Cartesian straitjacket, seems to remain under the spell of this individualistic limitation of the theory of intentionality, when he portrays practical intentionality to be a lonely affair of a single individual (who has customers and suppliers, but no co-workers). But intentionality is not only a matter of single individuals. It is also something individuals can *share*. Not all intentions come in the form *ego cogito*. Some come in the form *nos cogitamus*. This important fact is just as absent in Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* as it is in Descartes' *Meditationes*. It was only in the last twenty years that shared intentionality has

¹⁵ Baier, Annette C.: Doing Things With Others: The Mental Commons, in: Alanen, Lilli/Heinämaa, Sara/Wallgren, Thomas (eds.): *Commonality and Particularity in Ethics*. London 1997, p. 15-44.

become the topic of thorough and systematic philosophical analysis.¹⁶ At the same time, however, it seems that the current debate on collective intentionality and shared intentional activity could profit quite considerably from some of Heidegger's thoughts, especially from his courses of lectures from the time between the publication of *Being and Time* and his infamous ontology of the people in the thirties. In a course of lectures called "Introduction to Philosophy"¹⁷ Heidegger proposes an analysis of the disclosedness of the world that goes far beyond the atomistic limitations of the conception of *Being and Time*, and that might even turn out to be of relevance for the current debate on collective intentionality and joint intentions. Heidegger here analyzes what it means to share experiences. Just like Max Scheler, he is clear-headed enough to reject any reduction of shared intentionality to a combination of individual intentionality and something like iterated reciprocal knowledge (*common knowledge*) in the way it is proposed by analytical philosophers such as Raimo Tuomela and Michael Bratman in the current debate. And unlike John R. Searle in his theory of collective intentionality, Heidegger makes clear that shared intentionality is not compatible with an internalist framework, for it is not just a matter of what goes on in individual minds, but a matter of actual intersubjective relations. Thus in Heidegger's account, two important features of an adequate theory of shared intentionality can be found: firstly, shared intentionality is irreducible to sets of individual intentionality, and secondly, it is not just a matter of some collective "form" of intentionality that is nevertheless contained in individual minds, but a matter of actual intersubjective relations.¹⁸

¹⁶ It seems that Raimo Tuomela has the merit of having the topic put on the map of analytical philosophy. Other important contributors to the ongoing debate include Margaret Gilbert, John R. Searle, and Michael E. Bratman. For an overview cf. the following collections of essays: Georg Meggle (ed.): *Social Facts and Collective Intentionality*. Frankfurt am Main, Hänsel-Hohenhausen 2002. David Koepsell/Laurence S. Moss (eds.): *John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality. Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions*. London, Blackwell 2003. *Philosophical Explorations* VI/3, 2003, Special Issue: New Essays on Collective Intentionality.

¹⁷ Heidegger, Martin: *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Vorlesung Wintersemester 1928/29). Gesamtausgabe Bd. 27, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann 1996.

¹⁸ Cf. Schmid, Hans Bernhard: Can "Brains in Vats" Think as a Team? In: *Philosophical Explorations* VI/3 (2003), p. 201-217.

However, it is also true that Heidegger never really pursued this path any further. Even though Heidegger went quite far in overcoming the Cartesian Brainwash, he carefully kept away his novel and promising ideas about the sharedness of intentionality from what he considered to be the ground level of intentionality. Even in his series of lectures Heidegger calls the sharedness of intentionality a matter of mere *experience*, not of any *practical involvement* with the world. Thus at the basic level, the “disclosedness of the world” remains a matter of the single individual *Dasein*; the craftsman in his black forest workshop still has no co-workers, no master and no employees. Any sort of sharedness is confined to the upper levels of intentionality. This cognitivist limitation of the sharedness of intentionality, however, is not plausible. Sharedness is already a matter of the most basic form of our “being-in-the-world”, i.e. of our practical everyday routines. And shared practical involvement with the world, just like shared experiencing, is not reducible to an aggregate of individual “taking care”. To give an example: if you and me jointly carry a large sofa from the removal truck up to the new apartment on the third floor, the concrete surrounding world of our intentional activity – the corners and handrails of the staircase, for example – is neither disclosed in the light of my or your *individual* intentional activity, nor in the light of any average individual’s intentional activity, for that matter, but in the light of *our common aim*. “Common action” implies an irreducibly collective and relational form of circumspection, and accordingly, a shared disclosedness of the surrounding world, a fundamentally shared “being-in-the-world” – something that goes beyond any individualistic account of *Dasein*.

e) The Priority of (Shared) Intentionality over Social Normativity

With this radicalized (non-reductive and relational) concept of shared intentionality in mind, let us get back to the above question concerning the relation between intentionality and social normativity. The received view has it that any form of *shared* intentional activity *presupposes* social normativity, because it has to be based in some kind of *convention*, in some tacit or

explicit *agreement* between the participants. One obvious problem of this view (the view that bases the sharedness of intentionality in conventions and agreements) is that any form of convening, any kind of agreement is *itself* a shared intentional activity, and an especially complex one at that. All Conventions and Agreements *presuppose* shared intentionality, whereas it is not the case that all shared intentional activities imply agreements. Concerning this latter case I think John Searle is right when he emphasizes that it is possible to share an intention without there being *obligations* and *entitlements* involved between the participants. There are shared intentional activities in which no social normativity is involved, whereas the opposite is not the case (any kind of social normativity presupposes shared intentional activities such as the ones resulting in [tacit] agreements). Thus it seems that shared intentionality is more fundamental than social normativity. At the same time, however, there is something wrong with the Searlean picture of *permanently* normativity-free shared intentions. Even though shared intentionality does not presuppose any kind of social norms, there is always and inevitably a *drive towards normative stabilization* involved in any kind of social activity. Let us consider an example. Imagine you and me regularly meeting for a walk on Sunday afternoons. At first, we just happened to run into each other, we discovered that we had individually planned to walk the same way, and so it came that we took our walk *together*. Without there being any kind of agreement between us, the same happened again on the following Sunday. We met at the same time at the same place. Nevertheless, there was still no social normativity involved in our shared intentional activity at that point. No one felt obliged to come again on the next Sunday, or on any of the following Sundays, and no one felt entitled to an explanation from the part of the other if the other did not show up. There was no social normativity involved in our shared intentional activity whatsoever. Yet on the third or fourth Sunday at the latest – depending on circumstances such as the cultural environment and the personality of the participants – the situation will have started to change. Under normal circumstances, I will feel obliged to tell you other if I know that I cannot do my

part to our shared Sunday afternoon walk, and I will feel entitled to an explanation if all of a sudden, you do not show up at the usual place and time. Now the shared intentional activity has become a *socially normative* practice.

The clou of this whole story is the following: Social normativity arises out of shared intentionality. Social normativity does not originally come from some reciprocal ascription of obligations and entitlements, not from some intersubjective skorekeeping, as Brandom seems to believe,¹⁹ but simply from shared intentionality. Of course, there is a little more to this. I conjecture that the capacity of shared intentional activities to give rise to social normativity stems from the *pre-social normativity* of the relation between our shared intention and my individual contribution. If *we* intend to do x, this provides *me* with a reason to perform my individual contribution y. If *we* intend to go for a walk together, *I* have a *reason* to perform my part (even though I might not yet be *obliged* to do my part) – not to walk away from you, for example, or to adjust the pace of my steps to yours. And I assume that it is because of this *reason-providing role of shared intentions* that we tend to normatively *expect* the appropriate contributive behavior from each other in the case of repeated shared intentional activities.

Because I know that our shared intention provides you with a reason to do your part, I tend to normatively *expect* you to do your part. This is the stage where proper social norms come into play. In this perspective, the role of informal or formal social norms is to stabilize shared intentional activities by regulating the individual contributive behavior. Social norms determine what each of us, each individual should do in our common affairs (to take the example of the right hand side traffic rule as an example: *we* get by each other by *each one* keeping to his or her right). Thus social normes determine everyone's individual share in joint intentional activities, and ultimately everyones individual place in our common *Dasein*. And this is where the "One" or "Anyone" comes into play: two individuals who just happened to

¹⁹ Brandom, Robert B.: *Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*. Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press ²1998.

share an intention and to perform a shared intentional activity ultimately end up by being mostly concerned with whether or not their individual behavior conforms to or deviates from social norms and conventions. Thus *Dasein*'s initial concern with shared intentional activities has turned into a concern with whether or not one's individual behavior is or is not up to the standards of social propriety. In other words: our common *Dasein* has turned into an aggregate of individual "one-selves".

f) The Broken "We"

With this rough sketch of a general picture in mind, I shall try to reformulate Heidegger's analysis of everydayness. The foremost revision against the view usually ascribed to *Being and Time* is that we should not see our being-in-the-world, the disclosedness of our surrounding world and our most basic involvement with the world *only* as a matter of our *individual Dasein*. It is *also* irreducibly (but not exclusively) a matter of our *shared Dasein*. My participating in a common action is neither a mode of being towards *my own (individual) possibilities* nor a mode of being towards an exchangeable individual Anyone's possibilities. The alternative between the public "one-self" (where *Dasein* has no sense of its own individual possibilities) and the authentic individual self (where *Dasein* seizes its own individual possibilities) is not exhaustive. For there are possibilities that *Dasein* does not have as an individual, but only as *shared* or *common Dasein*. And since the possibilities in Heidegger's conception make up the core of the very *being* of *Dasein*, one should say: *Dasein* is not only a matter of single individuals, but also of communities. What is required in the analysis of *Dasein* is an extension from existential analysis to *co-existential* analysis.²⁰ This sheds new light on the inauthenticity of the "one-self". For it is not the *individual* being, but the sharedness of *Dasein* that remains covered up in the sphere of norm-oriented action of the "Anyone". In everyday social contexts, we usually act on the basis of an understanding of

²⁰ Cf. Tatiana Shchytsova: *Die Nähe im Miteinandersein*, in this volume.

ourselves as single individuals who go about their individual business and follow their individual aims on the guideline of (and within the limits of) formal and informal social norms. Thus in our everyday attitude towards social norms, we are concerned with the conformity or nonconformity of our individual actions (Heidegger speaks of *Abständigkeit* – “distantiality” or, as it is also translated, “standoffishness”); while going our own individual ways, we either conventionally stick to the traffic regulations or just strategically avoid being caught violating them, now and then getting annoyed when the regulations appear to be a hindrance or nonsensical in the light of our individual plans or preferences. As everyday individuals, we decide for or against acting the way “one” acts, for or against conforming to the social norms. Thus it looks as if we did what we did because it is uniform with what the others do, or because it deviates from the general standard, or because we expect some individual utility from the way we acted, or because it conforms to our deontological ethos. However, there is something that remains covered up in all of these views on our everyday acting in socially normative contexts: from the point of view of our *Shared Dasein*, social norms are no restrictions to individual actions, but instead determine our relation to those possibilities that we do not have as individuals, but only as a *Common Dasein*. What makes the “Anyone” inauthentic is not that *Dasein* has lost the relation to its individual possibilities, as Heidegger seems to suggest. Quite to the contrary: the problem is that *Dasein* thinks of the possibilities at hand only in terms of her or his *individual* possibilities. Thus *Dasein* covers up its possibilities instead of grasping them, namely the possibilities it has only as common *Dasein*. In other words: the inauthentic “Anyone” should not see in contrast to an authentic *Dasein* that is completely individualized and separated from any other existence the way Heidegger’s theory of what he calls “existential solipsism” suggests.²¹ The authentic version of the “Anyone” is not the single, isolated self. And neither is it a collectivized version of the

²¹ Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 188.

atomistic self.²² Rather, the “Anyone” is, as Heidegger once called it, a “broken ‘we’”²³, a common or shared *Dasein* that misconceives of its own being in terms of an aggregate of single individuals.

It takes some kind of a disruption of this individualizing self-understanding of *Dasein* to become aware of the fact that norms and conventions are not just “restrictions” and “guiding lines” for *Dasein*’s individual actions, but the instruments with which, with more or less circumspection, we “take care” of our *Common Dasein*. Thus the recommendation for our everyday *Dasein* is not to flee from the public sphere and retreat to the stronghold of some lonely instrumental activity in a secluded workshop. To try to avoid inauthenticity does not entail leaving the public sphere. Quite to the contrary, it means to try to overcome our individualistic everyday point of view in taking the perspective of our *Common Dasein*. As compared to the individualistic viewpoint, this perspective opens up a whole new world of possibilities. As single individual everyday beings we can but stick to the norms, ignore or purposively violate them. It is only as *Common Dasein* that we have yet another possibility: we can *change* or *adapt* those norms according to our common aims and ends. This shift of attitude is the step away from the inauthenticity of the “one-self”. But it is not any sort of retreat to some lonely black forest workshop. It does not entail leaving the sphere of social normativity, but only to make social normativity transparent as what it is, namely the structure of our *Common Dasein*. In the public sphere, being authentic means giving up the perspective of the atomized individual by establishing an explicit relation to *those of our possibilities that we do not have as individuals, but only as a Common Dasein*.

²² Even though Heidegger seemed to propagate such a collectivized *Dasein* in the thirties (under the somewhat dubious title “*Dasein* of the people”), he was more clearly aware of the pitfalls of such a conception than even his teacher Edmund Husserl, who made use of the concept of “higher order personalities” during several decades of his life. For an example of Heidegger’s criticism of collectivism see Heidegger, Martin: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [1938]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 65, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann 1989, p. 320ff. For overview of Heidegger’s thoughts on the matter see Kisiel, Theodore: Der sozio-logische Komplex der Geschichtlichkeit des *Daseins*: Volk, Gemeinschaft, Generation. In: Weiß, Johannes (ed.): *Die Jemeinigkeit des Mitseins. Die Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers und die Kritik der soziologischen Vernunft*. Konstanz, UVK 2001, p. 85-104.

²³ Heidegger, Martin: *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* [1934]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 38, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann 1982, p. 43.

