

# Collective Intentionality Phenomenological Perspectives

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[Project Description No. PP001–110521]

*Abstract.* Can current collective intentionality analysis learn from a dialogue with early phenomenology and existential philosophy? This project introduces a new perspective into the current debate. It is rarely noted that collective intentionality was already the topic of philosophical inquiry in early phenomenology and existential philosophy. In this project, a wide array of these early contributions are searched and examined. This inquiry into history serves a philosophical purpose: the aim is to use the ideas to be found in early phenomenology and existential philosophy to advance current collective intentionality analysis. Within this venture, a hitherto largely unexplored kind of shared intentional states will come into focus. Until now, collective intentionality analysis has been concerned with *shared intentions* and *shared beliefs*. In this project, the focus will be extended to include *shared emotional* and *affective* intentional states. This *new focus* closes the gap between collective intentionality analysis and the philosophy of emotions, which is one of the key issues in current philosophy. A closer analysis of the structure and role of sympathy in *human cooperation*, and of the “sharedness” or *collectivity* of these intentional states, takes this project from the philosophy of emotions to the fields of social theory and social ontology. This *inter(sub)disciplinary approach* contributes to the general tendency in current collective intentionality analysis to pay more attention to its *transdisciplinary nature*, leading to a fuller conception of collective intentionality.

*Keywords:* collective intentionality, phenomenology, shared agency, shared emotions, sympathy, cooperation, commitment, altruism, social identity, group mind, action theory, philosophy of the emotions, social theory, social ontology

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## 1. Synopsis

**Background.** Whereas ‘classical’ analytical action theory and philosophy of mind focused exclusively on the analysis of *individual* intentionality, it has become increasingly clear over the last two decades that in order to account for the *social dimension of human action and cognition* the analysis has to be extended to *shared* intentional states. Based on seminal contributions dating from the eighties, the analysis of *collective intentionality* has gradually evolved into a distinct field of research in Europe and America.

**Significance.** The insights and conceptual tools which collective intentionality analysis generates are relevant not only within philosophy, but have also proven useful to neighboring disciplines. These include, among others, the social, political, and cognitive sciences, where collective intentionality analysis receives increasing attention. In philosophy as well as in these neighboring disciplines, collective intentionality analysis is by now widely recognized and established as a novel approach to the understanding of the social world.

**Key Issues.** This success notwithstanding, no consensus as to the nature and structure of collective intentionality has emerged as yet. The current debate is marked by persistent controversies among the most important contributors to the debate. These controversies revolve largely around the following three key issues:

1. *The Intentionality Issue:* What is the structure of the *intentionality* involved in collective intentional states? Is the difference between collective intentionality and individual intentionality primarily a matter of the *content*, the intentional *mode* or rather a matter of the *subject* of the mental states in question?
2. *The Coordination and Commitment Issue:* What is the “binding force” of collective intentional states? How, if at all, do *commitments* and *obligations* come into play? Does collective intentionality analysis require us to depart from the existing approaches to human behavior?
3. *The Collectivity Issue:* In what sense is *collectivity* involved in collective intentionality? Does collective intentionality presuppose (or constitute) collectives or supra-individual agents/subjects?

Roughly stated, these controversies correspond to the three main philosophical subdisciplines involved in current collective intentionality analysis, i.e. action theory, (philosophical) social theory, and social ontology, respectively.

**Lacunae.** The Research *lacunae* in current collective intentionality analysis to be addressed in this project are the following:

- a. It is widely ignored in the current debate that collective intentionality has been in the focus of earlier philosophical analysis, particularly in social phenomenology and existential philosophy.
- b. The scope of shared intentional states taken into account in current collective intentionality analysis is usually limited to shared intentions and shared beliefs (i.e. practical and cognitive intentionality), leaving the (presumably very important) role of *shared emotional* or *affective states* largely out of the picture.
- c. While it seems obvious that the key issues and *foci* of controversy in the current debate are not to be treated independently of each other, the inter(sub)disciplinary aspects of collective intentionality analysis have not received sufficient attention.

**Aim of this Project.** This project aims at filling in these *lacunae* by introducing a new *perspective, focus, and approach* into current collective intentionality analysis.

- i. **Historical Perspective.** As the first of its kind, this project systematically searches and evaluates earlier contributions to collective intentionality analysis to be found in early phenomenology and existential philosophy.
- ii. **Focus on Shared Emotions.** Based on contributions to the topic to be found in early phenomenology and existential philosophy, this project focuses on the analysis of *shared emotions*.
- iii. **Inter(sub)disciplinary Approach.** This project pays special attention to the inter(sub)disciplinary nature of collective intentionality. The parts of this project are situated at the *intersections* between the philosophical (sub)disciplines which are most relevant to collective intentionality analysis.

**Structure of the Project.** The proposed research project is in three parts. These parts are by the following titles and address the following research questions:

**Part A:** *What is “Shared” in Sympathy? Collective Intentionality Analysis and the Emotions*

- In what sense can emotions be shared? Are there different types and degrees of “sharedness”? In what sense is emotional “sharedness” involved in sympathy?
- What is the philosophical significance of shared emotions (esp. for social philosophy)?
- How do shared feelings fit into our commonsensical view of feelings as individual mental states?

**Part B:** *Beyond Egoism and Altruism? Sympathy, Commitment, and Social Identity*

- What is the conceptual role of sympathy in human cooperation?
- Can an adequate account of sympathy shed light on what makes people think and act as members of a team (social identity)?
- Does an adequate account of the role of social identities in human cooperation require us to go beyond the conceptual dualism of egoism and altruism?

**Part C:** *Return of the Group Mind? Social Identity and Collective Intentionality.*

- What is the role of group mind concepts (and related ideas) in the current debate on collective intentionality and in early phenomenology and existential philosophy?
- Does the thesis that groups can “have” emotions involve a group mind?
- Are there arguments for the assumption of a group mind, or related concepts, particularly in the theory of social identities?

**Methods.** This project uses the tools of analytic philosophy. In addition to this, phenomenological and hermeneutical methods play an important role.

**Personnel.** The research team will consist of the applicant, one advanced researcher, one graduate student, and a research assistant (*Hilfsassistent*). The project will extend over four years.

**Collaborations.** This project will be carried out in close collaboration with internationally leading experts in the field as well as existing local and national networks and research contacts.

**Output.** As part of the project, two workshops and a large international conference on collective intentionality analysis are planned. The results of the project will be published as monographs, collections of essays, and as papers in refereed journals.

## 2. Project Description

### 2.1. State of Research in the Field

#### 2.1.1. Collective Intentionality in Analytic Philosophy

Scattered remarks on shared intentions and short analyses of how individual intention can be “we-derivative” in Wilfrid Sellars’s work are usually seen as the origin of current collective intentionality analysis (cf. Sellars 1965; 1974, 40f.; 1980, 99; [1966] 1992, 215ff.).<sup>1</sup> Inspired by these seminal contributions, a small number of analytical philosophers started to make collective intentionality the topic of systematic and thorough research during the 80ies and early 90ies, thereby delineating a number of positions whose features and differences have shaped collective intentionality analysis as we know it today. Here is a very brief summary of the main positions, and a remark on the development of the debate.

Raimo Tuomela was the first to take up the issue. His influential position marked the beginning of the current debate (Tuomela 1984; Tuomela/Miller 1988). Tuomela has continually extended and refined his analysis in his later work, aiming at providing a systematic conceptual overall framework for the analysis of the social world (Tuomela 1995; 2000; 2002). Among the core features of his account are the concepts of *we-intention* and the *we-mode*.<sup>2</sup> Tuomela’s analysis started with a focus on *action theory* (Tuomela 1984), but gradually expanded to all areas of collective intentionality research, including *social theory* (cf., e.g., Tuomela 2000), and *social ontology* (cf., e.g., Tuomela 1995, chaps. 4, 9). A main focus of the ongoing discussion of Tuomela’s account concerns the nature of the relation between the individual participants’ “we-intentions” and the collective level.<sup>3</sup>

In 1989, Margaret Gilbert’s book *On Social Facts* marked the beginning of what she pursues under the label “Plural Subject Theory” (Gilbert 1989; 1996; 2000). The main focus of her *normativist* analysis of collective intentionality is on the emergence of a collective “command center” (Gilbert 2000, p. 5) out of an agreement between the participants, and on the mutual obligations and entitlements involved in shared agency. Particularly in ethics and political philosophy, her account meets with increasing interest. Open questions and ongoing controversies concern the structure of the participating individuals’ *commitments* involved in “plural subjecthood” (cf., e.g., Brewer 2003), and the applicability of plural subject theory to larger groups and political bodies (for critical assessments cf., e.g., Wilkins 2002; Baltzer 2002).

The label “collective intentionality” became known to the wider public through the prominent role assigned to the concept in John R. Searle’s *Construction of Social Reality* (Searle 1995), as well as in Searle’s later account of his overall philosophical program (Searle 1998). Searle’s notion of collective intentionality is developed in some detail in his first publication on the matter (Searle 1990), and remains much the same in his later work. The two core features of his theory are a) a strong claim concerning the *irreducibility* of collective intentions to individual intentions, and b) an equally strong commitment to *internalism*. According to Searle, collective intentions are intentional states of the form “we intend...” in the minds of the single individuals, and these intentional states are structurally independent of the existence of anything outside the individual mind, including the existence of the presumed “co-intenders”. Especially the latter feature of Searle’s

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<sup>1</sup> Another source that might have been of just as much influence is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s insistence on the importance of the “we”.

<sup>2</sup> The former basically consists in the participant individuals’ intending to do *their part* in the shared activity *as their part*, and a notion of mutual belief among the participants about the other participating individuals’ intentions. Roughly speaking, the theory of the we-mode provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of what it means to think and act as a group member.

<sup>3</sup> Tuomela’s account has often been criticized for oscillating between two equally unacceptable alternatives, i.e. *circularity* on the one hand, and *reductivism* on the other. For Tuomela’s refutation of this line of criticism see Tuomela 2005.

account has been subject to harsh criticism in the rich literature devoted to closer inspection of Searle's influential account (cf. Meijers 1994; 2003, and, among many others, Zaibert 2003; Johansson 2003).

By contrast to John Searle's account, Michael Bratman's influential analysis of collective intentions is "reductive in spirit" (Bratman 1999, 108). It relies on the notion of an *interrelation* of individual intentions (Bratman 1999, esp. chaps 5-8). These intentions are collective in their *content*. The intentions in question are of the form "I intend *that* we J" (where J is the joint activity in question). In accordance with Bratman's theory of practical reason, which is based on the notion of *plans* (Bratman 1987), special emphasis is laid on the requirement of "meshing subplans" from the side of the participating individuals. Controversies revolving around his analysis are focused mostly on the possibility and presuppositions of intentions of the form "I intend that we J" (cf. Velleman 1997; Stoutland 2002).

The concept and the very idea of collective intentionality analysis in general, and the conceptions put forward by the main protagonists in particular, have been criticized from opposing sides. On the one hand, it has been claimed that collective intentionality analysis systematically *underestimates* the role of the *individual* in social action (Miller 1992; 2001). On the other hand, collective intentionality analysis has repeatedly been accused of being overly *individualistic* and even forthright "anti-social" (Baier 1997; Stoutland 1997). These lines of criticism notwithstanding, collective intentionality analysis has rapidly evolved into a new area of study, and has attracted the interest of a wider community of philosophers. A considerable number of workshops and conferences on the topic with increasing participation were held in the course of the past decade, most important among these the biannual *Conferences on Collective Intentionality* (cf., among others, Meggle 2002, Sintonen et al. 2003, Koepsell and Moss 2003, Hindriks and Meijers 2003, Schmitt 2003).

In its current form, collective intentionality analysis has emerged from analytical *action theory*. In accordance with its origins, the analysis of the intentional structure of *shared action* is still the main focus of the current debate. Over the last years, however, it has become more and more widely recognized that due to its very nature collective intentionality analysis involves more than one of the philosophical subdisciplines. While the action theory-approach to collective intentionality focuses on collective intentions *qua intentions*, an answer to the somewhat different question of what makes collective intentionality really *collective* brings *social ontology* into play. *Social theory* is an increasingly important subdiscipline insofar as collective intentionality analysis addresses basic conceptual issues concerning human coordination and cooperation. In addition to these leading philosophical subdisciplines in collective intentionality analysis, *epistemology* plays a role in the analysis of *common knowledge* and *shared beliefs*, which is part of collective intentionality analysis.<sup>4</sup> Parallel developments in other philosophical subdisciplines (such as the current discussion on *joint attention* (cf. Eilan et al. [eds.] 2005) indicate an increasing demand for inter(sub)disciplinary work in collective intentionality analysis. (This project adds to the development towards an ever fuller and more trans(sub)disciplinary account by bringing in the philosophy of emotions as another philosophical subdiscipline).

In addition to the increasing interest in collective intentionality analysis in these areas of philosophical research, collective intentionality analysis attracts the interest of researchers and scholars in neighboring disciplines, ranging from developmental psychology (Tomasello/Rakoczy 2003) to legal theory (cf. Kutz 2000; Shapiro, forthcoming) and cognitive science (cf. Cohen/Levesque 1991). Unique among the interdisciplinary rapports is economic theory, esp. decision theory, where collective intentionality analysis meshes seamlessly with a parallel discussion on the role of *team thinking* (or *team member rationality*) in the theory of cooperative and coordinated behavior (cf. Hollis/Sugden 1993; Bacharach 1998; Sugden 2000; Gold [ed.] 2004). Here, collective intentionality analysis has helped to shed light on the structure of conventions, rational trust (cf., e.g., Hollis 1998), and the role of the identity of the chooser in rational choice (cf. also Anderson 2001; Davis 2002, as well as John Davis's many other contributions to the topic).

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<sup>4</sup> Another connection between epistemology and collective intentionality analysis is in *social epistemology*.

### 2.1.2. Key Issues in the Current Debate

If it is always a matter of opinion which issues and developments in a given field of research deserve the most attention, this is particularly so in a relatively new and rapidly evolving area of study such as collective intentionality analysis. I believe, however, that the following distinction between three *foci* of debate (or “issues”, as I call them) will be unbiased enough to represent the basic structure of the current debate with sufficient adequacy for the purpose of this project description:

**The Intentionality Issue.** Collective intentionality analysis is widely acknowledged for substantially extending our understanding of intentionality and action, which was limited to individual intentionality in much of earlier action theory. In spite of all efforts and discussions, however, no consensus as to the intentionality involved in shared agency has emerged as yet. This is particularly disturbing because in some parts at least, the conceptions of the protagonists in the debate do not only vary in their focus but seem incompatible. Controversies in this area include the structure of the “participatory intentions” (Kutz 2000b), and the structure of *mutual knowledge* or *belief* required from the side of the participating individuals by some of the existing accounts. Of particular importance among the antagonisms that mark this key issue of collective intentionality analysis are the controversies between *internalist* positions (such as Searle’s) and their externalist or *interrelationalist* counterparts on the one hand, and between *reductivist* accounts (such as Miller’s and Bratman’s) and their non-reductivist counterparts on the other hand.

**The Coordination and Commitment Issue.** What is the glue that interconnects the participating individuals’ contributions to the collective venture? Controversies pertaining to this issue revolve around the nature and structure of the “ties” or “binding forces” involved in collective intentionality. An example is the question of what kind of *social normativity* is involved in collective intentionality (if any at all). Do shared intentions involve mutual *obligations and entitlements* from the side of the participants, as Margaret Gilbert claims (cf. e.g., Gilbert 1992; for an opposing view cf. Sugden 2000)? Directly related to this focus of controversy is the rapidly growing debate concerning the nature and extend of *collective responsibility* (cf., among many others, Kutz 2000; Gilbert 2002; Corlett 2002; Miller, forthcoming; *collective responsibility* will be in the focus of the 5<sup>th</sup> *Conference on Collective Intentionality* in Helsinki, Aug. 31 -Sept. 2). Another discussion that addresses the coordination and commitment issue concerns the status of *rationality* in shared intentional activities. More precisely, the question is whether the analysis of the structure of collective intentionality requires us to depart from the orthodox model of rationality in action. Those who argue that such a departure is necessary tend to emphasize the “deconditionalizing problem” (Tuomela 2002, 388) of the orthodox theory of rational coordination (cf. Sugden 1993; Bacharach 1998); suggestions concerning necessary revisions to our concept of rationality in action range from the notion of “constitutive rationality” (Hurley 1989) to the principle of the priority of the determination of the agent’s social identity to rational choice (Anderson 2001), leaving the question open as to how this identity might be determined. Those who argue that such a departure is not necessary tend to emphasize the non-rational elements in human cooperation (cf., e.g., Pettit and Schweikard, forthcoming).

**The Collectivity Issue.** The third controversy concerns the *status of the collective* in shared intentionality. The question here is, if and in how far genuine collectivity is involved in shared intentionality and in how far the respective intentions and actions can (or have to) be ascribed to *groups* instead of the participating individuals. The answers given to this question range from the strongly individualistic view put forward by Miller to more holistic accounts such as the one put forward by Bratman and to Gilbert’s conception of *plural subjecthood*. It seems telling that in spite of its apparent collectivist connotations, *group mind related ideas, terms, and labels* have come into use in parts of the current debate, ranging from talk of “modernized versions” of the group mind (cf. Tuomela 1995, p. 231), a seemingly organicist understanding of team membership (Sugden 1993,

p. 86) up to concepts of collective personhood (Pettit 2003; for a conceptual analysis of collective personhood which seems to be of considerable influence on the current debate cf. Rovane 1997). According to some participants in the current debate, the controversy concerning the nature of the collectivity involved in collective intentionality adds a *new dimension* to social ontology (Pettit/Schweikard, forthcoming), which has to be addressed separately from the previously dominant issues in social ontology, such as the much-debated issues concerning the atomism-individualism-controversy on the one hand, and the antagonism between holism-collectivism on the other hand (Pettit 1993).

### 2.1.3. Lacunae

This project aims at filling in important *research lacunae* in the current debate by introducing a *historical perspective* into current collective intentionality analysis (1), by focusing on the structure and role of *shared emotions* (2), and by taking an *intersubdisciplinary approach* to collective intentionality, intersecting the boundaries between action theory, social theory, and social ontology (3).

**1) Historical Perspective.** With very few exceptions (Mulligan 2001; forthcoming), it has been widely ignored in current collective intentionality analysis that collective intentionality is not an altogether new research topic.<sup>5</sup> Collective intentionality used to be a focus of thorough philosophical research long before the current debate started. This is particularly true for the phenomenological school of thought around Edmund Husserl (it is important, however, to be aware of the differences between the phenomenological approach to intentionality, especially in Husserl's later work, and the way intentionality is conceived of in the context of current analytical philosophy<sup>6</sup>). Here, parts of Husserl's own analyses are of particular interest, as well as the works (or parts thereof) by the following authors are of particular interest (listed by year of birth): Max Scheler, Simon L. Frank, Ludwig Binswanger, Nicolai Hartmann, Adolf Reinach,<sup>7</sup> José Ortega y Gasset, Tomoo Otaka, Martin Heidegger, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Edith Stein, Karl Löwith, Gerda Walther, Alfred Schütz, Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (among others). This historical inquiry serves a philosophical purpose. The aim is to use the ideas to be found in early phenomenology and existential philosophy to advance current collective intentionality analysis.

**2) Focus on Shared Emotions.** Up to the present, collective intentionality analysis has almost exclusively been concerned with shared intentions and, more recently, with shared beliefs. A third kind of intentional states, however, has almost completely been left out of the picture: no systematic analysis of *shared emotions* has been put forth so far. A historical perspective will contribute to filling in this lacuna, because important material on this topic can be found in phenomenology and existential philosophy (cf. the detailed description below in sect. 2.3.1.1.) This seems particularly important since the *philosophy of emotions* is an important branch of the current international philosophical discussion, and among the key topics of current philosophical research in Switzerland. Various research projects in the philosophy of the emotions are under way in Switzerland, particularly as part of the *National Centre of Competence in Research of the Affective Sciences* and the *centre*

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<sup>5</sup> Exception such as Margaret Gilbert's discussion of Georg Simmel's theory of groups (1989, chap. 4), or Philip Pettit's subtle remarks concerning Durkheim's account (Pettit 1993) cannot make up for the general neglect of this perspective. The only historical reference which is quite regularly found in the current literature is a stern rebuttal of alleged old collectivist ideas such as they are usually ascribed to Hegel (for a typical example cf. Searle 1998).

<sup>6</sup> The most obvious among the differences is that in early phenomenology, the *paradigm cases* of intentionality are *cognitive* intentional states such as beliefs, whereas *practical* intentions are in the center of the current debate. There are, however, unified accounts of all kinds of intentionality both in phenomenology and existential philosophy (particularly in Scheler and Heidegger; the latter avoids the term "intentionality" because of its alleged "cartesian" connotations), and in the current debate (Searle). Another difference concerns the idealistic slant of much of later Husserlian phenomenology and parts of existential philosophy.

<sup>7</sup> For an analysis of the relations between Reinach's theory of social acts and John L. Austin's and John R. Searle's analysis of speech acts cf. Mulligan 1987.

*interfacultaire en sciences affectives* at the University of Geneva (workshops and conferences on the philosophy of the emotions have recently been held or will be held at the Universities of Zurich and Neuchâtel). The *focus on shared emotions* will contribute to closing the gap between current collective intentionality analysis and the philosophy of the emotions.

**3) Inter(sub)disciplinary Approach.** The abovementioned three key issues in the current debate (i.e. the *intentionality issue*, the *coordination and commitment issue*, and the *collectivity issue*) are distinct from each other in focus and belong to different subdisciplines or research fields (i.e. philosophy of mind, social theory, and social ontology, respectively). At the same time, however, these issues are closely *interrelated* in that most (not all!) moves in one field have direct impact on the others. Thus it seems clear that a strongly non-reductivist *and* interrelational conception of collective intentionality will tend to subscribe to a more *holistic* or *anti-singularist* notion of the collectivity involved than a reductivist and/or internalist account.<sup>8</sup> And the status ascribed to collectivity will inevitably have consequences concerning the role of rationality and of the commitments and responsibilities involved in shared intentional activity. Because of these close interrelations between these issues an adequate account of collective intentionality will have to approach the phenomenon from all three sides. The intentionality issue, the collectivity issue, and the coordination issue have to be addressed *simultaneously* and with an eye on the interrelations between these issues. Intersecting the boundaries between social ontology, philosophy of mind, and social theory/moral philosophy is required by the very nature of the research topic. This essentially *inter(sub)disciplinary nature of collective intentionality analysis* has not received sufficient attention in the current debate. In order to make substantial advances in the central areas of collective intentionality analysis it seems important to focus on the *intersections* between the key issues in the current debate.

## 2.2. State of the Applicant's Own Research in the Field

The following three strands in my earlier research are pertinent to the proposed project. Firstly, I have been engaged in collective intentionality analysis over an extended period of time (a); secondly, I have extensively worked on phenomenological and existential philosophy (b); and thirdly, I have a background in the social sciences (sociology), and a substantial part of my previous work has been on social theory and the philosophy of economics (c).

a) I have been involved in collective intentionality analysis over the last five years, closely following the development of the debate and taking an active part in several of the central controversies (cf. Schmid 2001c; 2003a; 2003b; forthcoming 2005; 2006a; 2006b). As part of the proposed project, I am currently preparing two editions devoted to collective intentionality analysis. Together with Raimo Tuomela (University of Helsinki), I am preparing an anthology containing the most important contributions to the debate, together with some new material by Raimo Tuomela, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and Seumas Miller, among others (Tuomela/Schmid [eds.], in preparation). It is planned to complement this anthology with an account of the history of collective intentionality analysis in the introduction. Together with Michael Quante and David Schweikard (University of Essen, soon University of Cologne), I am editing a volume on collective intentionality analysis in German (Schweikard/Quante/Schmid [eds.], in preparation). Existing research contacts in this field include, among others, Raimo Tuomela and his research team *Philosophy of Social Action*, Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University), Margaret Gilbert (University of Connecticut).

b) In my previous research, I have extensively worked on phenomenology, particularly on the phenomenology of the social world (Schmid 1996; 1997; 2000a; 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2003c; 2003d; 2004b; forthcoming 2006c). Husserlian Phenomenology, and phenomenological

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<sup>8</sup> Thus Searle's commitment to *both* non-reductivism *and* methodological individualism comes at the price of a denial of the relational aspects of collective intentionality, as a great many of his critics have pointed out.


sociology count among my areas of specialization. My dissertation on the significance of Husserl’s philosophy for social theory appeared as a monograph in the *Phaenomenologica* book series, edited by the Husserl Archives, Leuven (Schmid 2000a). Several of my articles are on Martin Heidegger’s social ontology (Schmid 2001c; 2002a; 2004b). In this field of research, I have been in close collaboration with Dieter Thomä (University of St. Gallen) and Emil Angehrn (University of Basel). Further research in this area contacts include, among others, the Husserl Archives at the University of Cologne (esp. Michael Quante, co-director as of autumn 2006).

c) I have a background in the social sciences (including a doctorate in sociology), which is of special importance with regard to the parts of this project devoted to social theory and the history of social thought. Published works in this field include Schmid 1996; 2004a; 2005a; 2005b, among others. Among my research contacts in this field are Urs Stäheli, (University of Basel), and Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz (University of Zürich). Over the period of the last five years I have developed a specialization in Economics and Philosophy in teaching and research (cf. Schmid 2002b; 2005c; 2005d; forthcoming, 2006a). Among other activities, I have co-organized an international conference on Amartya Sen’s critique of rational choice theory (co-sponsored by the SNF; cf. Peter/Schmid 2005; Peter/Schmid [eds.] 2006), in which internationally leading experts in economic theory were brought together with experts in collective intentionality analysis. The list of participants included Amartya Sen, Raimo Tuomela, Philip Pettit, Margaret Gilbert, and Robert Sugden. The contributions to this conference were published/will be published in Peter/Schmid 2005 and Peter/Schmid (eds.) 2006. As a sequel to this workshop, a small conference on Sympathy and Altruism is planned as part of the proposed project in cooperation with Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick), Michael Schefczyk (University of Zurich), and Dieter Thomä (University of St. Gallen). Further contacts in this area include Gebhard Kirchgässner (University of St. Gallen).

### 2.3. Detailed Project Description

#### 2.3.1. Structure of the Research Project

The three individual parts of the project (A-C) are situated at the intersections between the philosophy of mind (esp. the philosophy of emotions), social theory, and social ontology.



**Table 1:** Parts and subdisciplines.

##### 2.3.1.1. Part A: What is “Shared” in Sympathy? Collective Intentionality Analysis and the Emotions

*Description.* Originating in the analytical philosophy of action, collective intentionality analysis has mostly been concerned with the analysis of *practical* intentionality. Yet most analyses of shared intentions include an element of shared *cognitive* or *theoretical* intentionality insofar as they require some sort of “common knowledge” or “mutual belief” from the side of the participants. It has long been recognized that there are difficulties with the structure of common knowledge, which

is indeed no less controversial than the structure of shared intentions (the “classical” reference is Lewis 1969; cf. also Heal 1978; for current views cf., among many others, Gilbert 1989; Tuomela 2001). More recently, the debate has come to include a wider array of shared cognitive (and partly normative) intentional stances, especially *collective acceptance* (Wray 2001; Tuomela 2003).

As opposed to practical and cognitive intentionality, the third of the basic “modes” of intentionality<sup>9</sup> has hardly ever received any attention at all.<sup>10</sup> Yet it seems plausible that an adequate understanding of the role of shared intentional states in the make-up of the social world in general and shared action in particular requires an extension of the analysis to *emotional* or *affective* intentions. The question is: what is the structure and role of shared *feelings* and *emotions*? This lacuna seems particularly disturbing in the light of the fact that the emotions are among the *key topics* in the current philosophical discourse.<sup>11</sup> This makes the need for an analysis of *shared emotions* all the more urgent.<sup>12</sup> It seems plausible that the refined understanding of the “sharedness” of practical and cognitive intentionality, as developed in current collective intentionality analysis, will help to understand the basic structure of shared emotions. Conversely, it seems very likely that an understanding of shared emotions will advance the analysis of shared agency and shared belief.

In this part of the project, the term “sympathy” is used in the wide literal sense of a “community of feeling”, i.e. for shared feelings of any kind. This conforms to the use proposed by Scheler (even though this use of the term incorporates some cases which are not cases of sympathy in the everyday sense of the word, such as guilt feelings [as discussed by Gilbert], or collective grief [as discussed by Scheler and Stein], or love [as discussed by Binswanger]). The main philosophical problem with a strong concept of sympathy in Scheler’s sense, i.e. with the assumption that emotions can literally be *shared* (in terms of having a token-identical feeling) is that it seems obvious that one cannot have feelings other than *one’s own* (an argument which closely parallels an objection raised against Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity). In this view, sympathy entails having a type-identical rather than a token-identical feeling. On the other hand, there seems to be a phenomenological difference between purely *individual* emotional states, however parallel, and genuinely *shared* feelings, which has to be accounted for. This will be the point of departure for this part of the project. Rich material pertaining to the phenomenology of the “sharedness” of emotional states can be found in early phenomenology and existential philosophy. Most prominently, the analysis of shared emotional states was in the focus of some of Max Scheler’s investigations (cf. among others of Scheler’s works, Scheler [1912] 1974; [1916] 2000; van Hooft 1994). Scheler put forward a detailed analysis of different types and degrees in which emotional states can be shared, basing his analysis in the concept of “immediate sympathy” (“unmittelbares Mitfühlen”; cf., e.g., Scheler [1912] 1974, 23; [1916] 2000, 516). In these phenomenological descriptions, Scheler claims the participant to have shared emotional states that are not reducible to a combination of individual emotional states and some structure of common knowledge about each other’s individual emotional states. Other important phenomenological analyses of shared emotional states can be found in the works of Edith Stein (Stein [1917] 1980; 1922, 120-150) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (cf. Matustik 1991). Particular attention shall be given to Heidegger’s analysis of *Befindlichkeit* and *Gestimmtheit*, especially insofar as *Mitsein* is concerned, and to Ludwig Binswanger’s analysis of the element of emotional sharedness implied in *love*. In this part of the project, the *structure* of shared emotional states shall be in the focus.

*Research Questions.* The questions to be addressed in this part of the project are the following: in what sense can emotions be shared? What are the different types and degrees of “sharedness”?

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<sup>9</sup> For a short introduction into the different basic “modes” of intentionality cf. Searle 1998, 99ff.

<sup>10</sup> An important exception to the rule is Gilbert’s analysis of collective feelings of guilt, where Gilbert claims that such “feelings” do not necessarily have any phenomenological components; cf. Gilbert 2000, 97-122.

<sup>11</sup> Key contributions that initiated the current debate include, among many others, de Sousa 1987; Gordon 1987; Calhoun/Solomon (eds.) 1984.

<sup>12</sup> One of the very few papers on the topic is Hutto 2002. This contribution demonstrates the necessity of further conceptual clarification of the role and meaning of “sharedness” in the philosophy of emotions.

What is the philosophical significance of shared emotions? How do shared emotions fit into our commonsensical view of feelings as individual mental states? What is the relation between “fellow feeling” and the “community of feeling” in sympathy? Do shared emotional states necessarily involve *phenomenological aspects* (as Scheler and Stein seem to claim), or are they rather to be seen as a sort of collective *judgement* (as Gilbert has it)? Are shared feelings reducible to individual feelings, combined with some sort of knowledge concerning the other’s feeling (empathy)? Are shared feelings compatible with internalism? What are the conceptual consequences concerning the concept of mind, if the answer is in the negative (as it seems to be the case in Scheler and Heidegger)?

*Significance.* The particular significance of these questions stems from the fact that the concept of sympathy plays an increasing role in various domains in current philosophy (cf., e.g., Taylor 2002), ranging from ethics (cf., e.g., Taylor 1999; Hacking 2001) to the controversy between the simulation-theorists and the theory-theorists of the mind in cognitive science (cf., e.g., Goldie 1999). In most of these contributions extensive reference is made of David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s analyses of sympathy. By contrast to this, the vast *phenomenological work* on the topic is being somewhat neglected. It seems, however, that the element of “sharedness” implied in the very notion of sympathy has never been focused on more directly than in phenomenological philosophy. The phenomenological perspective is important for all areas of analysis in which sympathy now plays a key role, particularly with regard to the problem of the “sharedness” implied in sympathy, which is a widely ignored issue in much of the areas in which this concept is in use.

### 2.3.1.2. Part B: Beyond Egoism and Altruism? Sympathy, Commitment, and Social Identity

*Description.* The concept of sympathy plays a role in parts of one of the central current debates in social theory, which is focused on the basic structure of cooperation and social action. The debate has recently been revived by the findings of experimental economists who have turned up surprisingly high levels of cooperation even in the presence of strong incentives to defection, which seems incompatible with the orthodox account of human behavior. While the explanation of this “robustness” of cooperation is largely a matter of empirical science, there are several serious conceptual issues involved here, too. One of the philosophical questions is whether the agent’s commitments to social norms and the provision of collective goods, and the choices which are guided by these commitments as revealed by experimental economists, can be understood as rational choices in the standard sense of the word, or whether it is necessary to depart from the standard model of practical reason in order to understand the structure of such (and similar) commitments. The proponents of the first view argue that all that is needed to incorporate commitment into the standard account is to allow for (weakly) altruistic preferences, and thus to depart from an overly narrow-minded and selfish view of action. In a controversial allusion to Adam Smith’s analysis of the role of sympathy in human action, these preferences are sometimes called “sympathetic”, meaning that in these cases the agent derives pleasure from contributing to other people’s well-being. In this context, “sympathy” thus describes the tendency to incorporate other people’s well-being into one’s own by means of a peculiar emotional response.<sup>13</sup> This terminology is taken up by the philosopher and Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen (1977; 2005), whose critique of rational choice theory plays a uniquely important role in the current debate. By contrasting “commitment” to “sympathy”, Sen places himself among those who believe that a more radical change in our understanding of social action is necessary. Together with other social theorists and philosophers, such as Robert Sugden (1993; 2000; Sugden/Hollis 1993), Michael Bacharach (1998), John Davis (2002), and Elizabeth Anderson (2001), he argues that it is necessary to incorporate a strong notion of the agent’s team member-

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<sup>13</sup> The allusion to Smith is controversial because in the later parts of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith explicitly claims that sympathy *transcends* human selfishness.

ships or *social identities* in order to be able to give an adequate account of human cooperation (Sen 1977; 2002; 2005). Even though the need for an account of the agents' "belonging" and "embeddedness" in social groups is widely recognized in much of the current debate, there are serious theoretical problems connected to this issue, particularly concerning the questions of how the individuals' social identities are determined (cf. Anderson 2001), how group identity relates to social norms (Bicchieri 2004), and concerning the question of the normative status of these identities (cf., e.g., Sen 1999). In the context of this debate, the question has re-emerged as to whether (1) the classical concept of rationality in action, stripped of its overly egocentric restrictions, is able to account for the structure of "acting as a team member", or whether (2) an altogether different concept of the rationality or "orientatedness" in action is needed for an adequate account of these phenomena (for a systematic account of the different possible positions cf. Tuomela 2000). As a third alternative (3), it is sometimes claimed that committed actions are ultimately non-rational, i.e. a matter of *blind impulses* rather than considered choices (cf. Peter/Schmid 2005; Peter/Schmid [eds.] 2006). The line of argument taken in this second part of the project will be an attempt to *integrate* these three views. At first glance at least, an integrative view seems to receive strong support from Ernst Fehr et al.'s studies of the structure of human cooperation (cf. e.g., Henrich et al. [eds.] 2004; Schmid, forthcoming [2005b]), especially it is made clear by its authors that the *emotions and feelings* of the participants play a key role in the process, which has always been emphasized by the proponents of the third view.

In addition to this, various attempts have been put forth to re-interpret Adam Smith's theory of *sympathy* in a way that sheds new light on the relation between sympathy, commitment, and social identity (Khalil 1990; Fontaine 1997; Sugden 2002). The general thrust of these and similar contributions to the debate is to interpret sympathy as a *source* of commitment (rather than as its counterpart, as it appears in Sen's analysis), and as an explanation of how agents come to feel and act as members of a team. At first glance at least, it seems that this view receives strong support from a theory of sympathy that emphasizes the element of *sharedness* or *commonality of feeling*. Picking up on these contributions, as well as on the reconstruction of the concept of sympathy to be developed in part A of the project, a special focus in this second part of the project (part B) will be on the question if and in how far an adequate analysis of sympathy requires us to depart from the motivational dualism of egoism and altruism. In the context of phenomenology and existential philosophy, José Ortega y Gasset has put forward the concept of the "nostristic attitude" (Ortega y Gasset 1957, 120ff.) as an orientation towards the common good that has to be carefully distinguished from – and is irreducible to – both egoism and altruism. The objective of this part of the project is to *use the phenomenological analysis of sympathy* to understand the structure of *nostrism*, and to introduce this view into the current debate on social identity, and on the limits of rational choice.

*Research questions.* The central questions to be addressed in this part of the project include the following: what is the conceptual role of sympathy in human cooperation? Can an adequate account of sympathy shed light on what makes people think and act as members of a team (social identity)? Does an adequate account of the role of social identities in human cooperation require us to go beyond the conceptual dualism of egoism and altruism?

### **2.3.1.3. Part C: Return of the Group Mind? Social Identity and Shared Intentionality**

*Description.* The current debate on the structure of collective intentionality is haunted by the specter of the group mind. Its importance in this debate seems to stem from a rather innocent-looking assumption. It seems plausible to assume that wherever there is intentionality, there has to be somebody who 'has' it. If it is further claimed that there is such a thing as *collective* intentionality and that collective intentionality has to be distinguished from *individual* intentionality, the conclusion imposes itself that it has to be not the single individuals but the collectives that 'have it'. From here it is just a short step to the *group mind*, because for collectives to *have* intentions, some sort of a 'collective mind' seems to be required, something hovering over and above the mind of the individuals. For its collectivist connotation, particularly because it seems incompati-

ble with a commonsensical notion of intentional autonomy, this idea does not look very appealing. By some of the leading proponents of collective intentionality analysis, any appeal to the group mind is therefore directly and unambiguously rejected (Searle calls it “a perfectly dreadful metaphysical excrescence”; Searle 1998, 150; cf. also Bratman 111; 122f.). Other proponents seem to advocate a more moderate strategy. Tuomela points out the possibility of incorporating some “modernized version” of the group mind in his account (Tuomela 1995, p. 231), and Margaret Gilbert, though far from giving this a mentalistic reading, makes some version of the collective subject the label of her entire theory (Plural Subject Theory). Still other contributors even seem to endorse the existence of “Groups with Minds of Their Own”, to quote the title of an influential paper by Philip Pettit (1993), or the existence (or at least the conceptual possibility) of collective personhood (Rovane 1998). Against the background of this apparent resurgence of a vocabulary that has been shunned for its collectivist (and even totalitarian) connotations, this third part of the project will address three issues.

Firstly, the numerous variations of concepts of the group minds, collective persons, and collective subjects shall be examined, which phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler (and in a particular sense Martin Heidegger) have put forth at various times and places of their work, and which – with the exception of the case of Heidegger – are conspicuously absent in the later interpretations of the work of these philosophers. Especially in the case of Husserl, an analysis of the use of these concepts (which extended over a vast period of his later work) seems urgently needed, and might turn out to be of great importance to the current debate. An inventory of these and related concepts in the works of these philosophers and a rough overview of its development shall be sketched, and the reasons that led these philosophers to endorse the group mind (and other phenomenologists to reject any such idea – cf., e.g., Schütz [1957] 1971, 114f.) shall be analyzed.

Secondly, the question of whether *emotional states* can be attributed to collectives shall be addressed. In what sense can collectives be the subject or “bearers” of emotions and feelings, and what is the relation to the emotions and feelings of the participating individuals?

Thirdly, the concept of “social identity” shall be examined. In a relatively uncontroversial core sense of the word, a given individual’s social identities are determined by whatever makes this individual a member of the groups to which she or he belongs. The standard view in the current debate is that the conceptual core of “collective identity” lies in some reflexive self-ascribed team-membership on the side of the participating individuals (cf., e.g., Abrams/Hogg 1990, 2ff.; Emcke 2000, 204ff.; Tamir 1996, 176ff.; Matthiesen 2003). This view, however, leads into difficulties, as can be learned from early phenomenological thought on social identity. Thus Simon L. Frank, whose significance for the phenomenology of the social world is often overlooked, has forcefully argued that an understanding of team membership in terms of the reflective attitudes of the individuals leads back into the very “atomism” from which departure is sought (Frank [1930] 2002, 130ff.). The question is: how can these difficulties be avoided? In some places of his work, Martin Heidegger remarks that the reflective identification from the side of the individuals might completely miss or distort *Dasein*’s sociality (cf. Heidegger [1934] 1982, 53; 55). Some phenomenologists and existential philosophers – particularly Sartre with his concept of “le “*nous*’-*objet*” (Sartre [1943] 1991, 465ff.), and Dietrich von Hildebrand in his *Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft* (1930), have put forward *pre-reflective notion* of sharedness or togetherness which revolve largely around the notion of shared intentionality.

*Research questions.* The central questions to be addressed in this part of the project are the following: What is the role of group mind concepts (and related ideas) in the current debate on collective intentionality and in early phenomenology and existential philosophy? Does the claim that groups can “have” emotions involve the group mind? Are there arguments for the assumption of a group mind or for related assumptions, particularly in the theory of social identities?

### 2.3.2. Personnel

The project makes the following demands on personnel:

The person in charge of **Part A** of the project should preferably hold a doctorate in philosophy and have a specialization in either or all of these areas: philosophy of mind, phenomenology, philosophy of the emotions. Some background in the social sciences (perhaps a minor in sociology) would be an asset but is not indispensable.

**Part B** of the project requires either of the following: a philosophy graduate with a background in social philosophy and philosophical social theory, or a sociology graduate with a specialization in phenomenological sociology and social theory, or an economics graduate with a specialization in philosophy and economics (in the latter cases, the doctoral dissertation of the student in charge of this subsection could be co-supervised by the applicant and a faculty member of the sociology department or the department of economics either at the university of Basel or at the university of St. Gallen, based on existing research contacts and collaborations of the applicant).

**Part C** of the project will be carried out by the applicant himself.

For the following tasks, a **research assistant** (*Hilfsassistent*) will be necessary: administrative support in the preparation of the two collected volumes on collective intentionality planned for 2007; extension and maintenance of the *Bibliography on Collective Intentionality* (in collaboration with Raimo Tuomela's research team); administrative support in the organization of the two workshops and of the large conference; development and maintenance of the project home page; literature research.

### 2.3.3. Collaborations

#### 2.3.3.1. Local and National Collaborations

At the local and national level, the project will collaborate closely with the following individuals and teams:

- *Swiss National Center for Competence in Research for the Affective Sciences*:<sup>14</sup> For the topic and perspective of parts A and B of the project, the opportunity to cooperate with the NCCR for the Affective Sciences is particularly fortunate. First contacts have been made. Special cooperation will take place with project 10 of the NCCR for the Affective Sciences (Prof. Dr. Kevin Mulligan, University of Geneva).
- *UFSP Foundations of Human Behavior. Altruism and Egoism* (University of Zurich).<sup>15</sup> A first meeting with Prof. Dr. Peter Schaber (chair for practical philosophy, affiliated with the UFSP Foundations of Human Behavior) has revealed vital interest in close cooperation, especially in part B of the project. Close research contacts exist with Dr. Michael Schefczyk (Universität Zurich) who is also a member of this research network.
- *Prof. Dr. Dieter Thomä* (University of St. Gallen): close collaboration is planned for part B of the project, including the organization of a workshop on sympathy and altruism in 2007 (together with Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick, and Michael Schefczyk, University of Zürich).
- *Prof. Dr. Angelika Krebs* (University of Basel): first contacts have disclosed a vital mutual interest in collaboration, especially concerning subdivisions A and B of the project (Krebs's current research project is on "dialogical love"; in this area, close cooperation is planned).

#### 2.3.3.2. International Collaborations

Close collaborations at the international levels include the following individuals and teams:

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.unige.ch/cisa/>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.iew.unizh.ch/altruismus/overview/index.html>

- Prof. Dr. *Raimo Tuomela* (University of Helsinki): close research contacts with Raimo Tuomela, one of the leading experts in collective intentionality analysis and the founder of the collective intentionality network, already exist. Further close collaboration with Raimo Tuomela and his research team “Philosophy of Social Action”<sup>16</sup> in several areas of the project is planned. This includes the co-edition of a volume on collective intentionality, planned for 2007.
- *Husserl Archives, University of Cologne*.<sup>17</sup> The Husserl Archives have expressed vital interest in close cooperation. Research contacts with the newly appointed co-director of the Husserl Archives, Prof. Dr. *Michael Quante* and his team, have already been established (including the co-edition of a collected volume on collective intentionality to appear in 2006/2007). Further collaboration is planned.
- Prof. Dr. *Georg Meggle* (University of Leipzig): existing research contacts with Prof. Meggle will be continued.
- Prof. Dr. *Michael Bratman* (Stanford University): collaboration with Prof. Bratman is planned; Prof. Bratman has agreed to support this project as a research contact.
- Prof. Dr. *Margaret Gilbert* (University of Connecticut): collaboration with Prof. Gilbert is planned. Prof. Gilbert has agreed to support this project as a research contact.
- Dr. *Fabienne Peter* (University of Warwick): existing close research contacts with Dr. Peter will be continued, especially in the context of part A of the project (and particularly in the organization of the 2007 workshop on sympathy and altruism).

#### 2.3.4. Conferences

As part of the project, it is planned to organize two workshops, and one large international conference:

**May 2007:** *Workshop on Altruism and Sympathy*, co-organized with Dieter Thomä (University of St. Gallen), Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick), and Michael Schefczyk (University of Zurich), hosted by the University of St. Gallen. This workshop will be a sequel to the 2004 “Workshop on Rationality and Commitment”, organized by the applicant together with Fabienne Peter and Dieter Thomä (Peter/Schmid 2005; Peter/Schmid [eds.], forthcoming). As in this former, very successful workshop, a small number (15-20) of internationally leading philosophers and social scientists will be invited. The aim is to develop the conceptual tools necessary for advancing our understanding of the basic structure of cooperation. The focus will be on recent work on altruism and the role of sympathy. Funding: Grundlagenforschungsfonds der Universität St. Gallen, SNF, ISC Foundation.

**Summer 2009:** *Workshop on Phenomenology and Social Ontology*: a smaller workshop on social ontology, hosted by the University of Basel, will bring together the most important local, national and international research contacts that have developed in the course of the first three years of work on the project. The aim of this workshop is a threefold one. Firstly (and most importantly), the interim results of the research carried out so far shall be presented and discussed, including drafts and sketches of the doctoral/habilitation theses and the monograph to be written within the frame of this project. Secondly, further perspectives opened by the search carried out in this project so far shall be discussed, *special attention will be on possible interdisciplinary implementations*. Thirdly, the large conference on Collective Intentionality that will be hosted in the following year shall be prepared. The organizing committee of this large conference will be invited to this workshop. Funding: SNF (and additional sources).

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/socact/>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.husserl.uni-koeln.de/>

**October 2010:** *Conference on Collective Intentionality Analysis* (title yet to be determined). A large international conference focused on collective intentionality analysis (including its interdisciplinary aspects and its history) will be hosted by the University of Basel. A number of top-ranking keynote speakers will ensure the international profile of this conference. In addition, it is planned to issue an open call for papers early in 2009 and to select a total number of 50-60 papers (presented in plenary sessions and parallel sessions). The applicant will propose to collaborate with the organizing committee of the biannual *Conferences on Collective Intentionality* to make this conference CollIntVII. Funding: SNF, FAG (other sources depending on the budget).

#### 2.4. Timetable

Below is a table of the main types of tasks to be performed within this project, with the numbers indicating the percentage of working time devoted to each task over the duration of the project.

The project is divided into three main phases:

- a) *Preparatory phase* (one year): literature research, preparation of a database, preparation of collaborations.
- b) *Analysis and conception* (two years): systematic analysis and evaluation of the relevant existing positions in the respective field in earlier phenomenology and current collective intentionality analysis; identification of *lacunae* to be filled or conceptual changes to be made, development and evaluation of possible lines of argumentation (in close collaboration with the local, national, and international research contacts).
- c) *Synthesis and presentation* (one year): completion of research, presentation of the results. This phase is intended for writing the doctoral dissertation, the two monographs, and an integrative final report.

Task/Academic Year	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10
Project management	5	5	5	5
Completion of the two collected volumes on collective intentionality <sup>1</sup>	15			
Literature research, historical resources <sup>2</sup>	30	10		
Literature research, current debate	30	15	10	5
Analysis and conceptual work in parts A, B and C of the project	10	50	30	
External collaborations and presentations <sup>3</sup>	5	10	15	20
Preparation of the final reports <sup>4</sup>			30	60
Workshops and conferences (preparation and organization)	5	10	10	10
Total in %	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>in preparation since summer 2005; <sup>2</sup>incl. phenomenology, existential philosophy, other sources; <sup>3</sup>incl. stays abroad, participation in external workshops and conferences, preparation of papers and presentations;

<sup>4</sup>monograph/habilitation thesis in part A, doctoral dissertation in B, and a monograph in part C.

**Table 2:** Tasks (percentage; time chart per annum)

#### 2.5. Significance of the Project, Output, Perspectives

Collective intentionality analysis is a relatively new field of philosophical study. As a recent movement with gaining momentum, it has already been widely recognized as a novel approach to the study of the social world. With its focus on phenomenology and existential philosophy, the role and importance of shared emotions, and on the interdisciplinary nature of collective intentionality analysis, this project fills in central *lacunae* in the current debate, and gives important impulses for the further development of collective intentionality analysis.

Following is a remark on the expected *output* of the project (a), a note on the career perspectives of the research personnel involved in the project (b), and a concluding statement underlining the significance of this research project (c).

a) The output of this project will include the following publications:

- Two collected volumes on collective intentionality (in preparation since 2005, to be completed as parts of this project)
- One doctoral dissertations (to be published either as monograph, or as a series of papers)
- A monograph by the person in charge of part A of the project (this could be submitted as a *Habilitationsschrift* [habilitation thesis])
- A monograph by the applicant
- Papers and reviews in refereed journals (the research personnel will be strongly encouraged to publish their papers in parallel with the completion of the manuscripts of their doctoral dissertation/monograph)
- Contributions to the media (esp. newspaper articles; I will continue to share the results of my research with the wider public, as I have done in my previous research projects)

b) This research project offers its junior and senior research personnel the opportunity to work in one of the most rapidly evolving research areas in the domain of current social thought. As far as their future career perspectives are concerned, the opportunity for international collaborations offered by this project, as well as its interdisciplinary setting, are particularly attractive.

c) Collective intentionality analysis is *Grundlagenforschung* (basic research) in the proper sense of the word. By substantially broadening and deepening our understanding of the structure of the social world, collective intentionality analysis provides new conceptual frameworks that have already proven to be fruitful for areas of study as diverse as the social sciences (particularly in the theory of cooperation and coordination), ethics (especially in the debate concerning collective responsibility), and political science (especially in the study of the structure of collective decision making). This project will contribute substantially to collective intentionality analysis with a new perspective, focus, and approach, and will add new fields of implementation of collective intentionality analysis by providing refined conceptual tools for the understanding of shared emotions and social identities.

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